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Go Big or Go Home? Right-Sizing Security Cooperation to
Fragile States
Abstract
This article tests two competing candidate theories of security cooperation provision
contained in the literature against a subset of stated strategic objectives by assessing
whether the amount of aid spent over time correlates with intended outcomes. One is
based on the principal-agent problem, while the other derives from the organizational
behavior model. The focus is solely on fragile states since they represent the most policyrelevant and challenging cases. Quantitative analysis utilizes existing datasets to provide
proxy measures for neopatrimonialism, praetorianism, and combat effectiveness,
corresponding to political, political/military, and military dimensions of security
cooperation efficacy, respectively. The results challenge the conventional wisdom that
increasing foreign aid merely feeds corruption and that to bolster foreign militaries is to
beg for a coup. Controlling for economic aid and GDP per capita, both small and large
military assistance packages strongly correlate with a reduction in neopatrimonialism and
deaths due to violent conflict and terrorism in recipient nations. While small aid programs
appear to temper the risk of a coup, this relationship does not hold for large ones. This
research also calls into question the oft-assumed degree to which principal-agent problems
and organizational behavior hamper effective aid provision.

This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/
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Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War—and especially since 9/11—
security cooperation has evolved into the American tool of choice for
reducing instability in the global periphery and extending its influence
abroad. While recent calamities such as the startling successes by Islamic
State and Taliban fighters over Iraq and Afghanistan’s U.S.-built security
forces increasingly call into question the wisdom of the current model,
preventing disasters like these from recurring presents a conundrum.
Abandoning security cooperation altogether is not a viable solution
because neither of the clear alternatives are politically tenable. Without it,
the United States will either have to more frequently shoulder the burdens
of utilizing its own forces in direct action or cede national prestige, global
influence, and strategic access to competitors. Military assistance is here
to stay since it is often the least bad option, but the need for a new
paradigm to guide its provision is clear.
The current approach to security cooperation derives from the widespread
post-9/11 belief that fragile states constitute the greatest source of danger
to the United States.1 As such, Congress approved a slew of new authorities
following that day’s tragedy to facilitate an increase in the amount of
military aid going overseas with the aim of enabling partners to counter
terrorist activities within their own borders.2 Aid flows consequently
increased from $7.34 billion in 2000 to a peak of $24.32 billion in 2011,
with a total of $351.99 billion spent between 2000 and 2020.3 A former
Department of Defense (DoD) official charged with oversight of the
Pentagon’s security assistance portfolio asserts with respect to resource
allocation and the needs of America’s partners, however, that the approach
in general is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. [sic]
priorities.”4 Concerns that the United States is simply spinning its wheels
take on added urgency given the recent and ongoing expansion of threats
that security cooperation is intended to address, which include cyber
security, illicit commercial activity, and countering Chinese and Russian
influence.5
The research in this article tests two competing candidate theories of
security cooperation provision contained in the literature against a subset
of stated strategic objectives by assessing whether the amount of aid spent
over time correlates with intended outcomes. One is based on the
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principal-agent problem, while the other derives from the organizational
behavior model. A correlation between increased spending and
improvements among recipient nations favors the use of large aid
packages (H1), while worsening conditions as budgets increase conversely
provides an element of justification to keeping security cooperation efforts
small (H2). It is also possible there is no correlation between spending and
outcomes, which would suggest security cooperation is ineffective in terms
of stated program objectives (H0). The data showing this relationship can
also serve as an indicator of the base rate of success by highlighting the
macro-level trends in how security cooperation affects the variables within
this article’s scope. This information is essential foundational data needed
by security cooperation practitioners to formulate sound policy. The focus
is solely on fragile states since they represent the most policy-relevant and
challenging cases. Quantitative analysis utilizes existing datasets to
provide proxy measures for neopatrimonialism, praetorianism, and
combat effectiveness, corresponding to political, political/military, and
military dimensions of security cooperation efficacy, respectively. Finally,
while both sides often lament the unsatisfied need for more suitable and
standardized measures of success, no studies to date have attempted a
quantitative evaluation of proxies.

Competing Theories of Security Cooperation
The two sides in the contemporary debate regarding theories of security
cooperation view either more or less expansive assistance programs as
better suited for achieving U.S. objectives. Advocates for large footprints
reason that regionally structured initiatives spread broadly across
recipients are unlikely to achieve much. As a result, they tend to call for a
go big approach to military aid programs. Stephen Biddle, Julia
Macdonald, and Ryan Baker make this claim explicitly, stating that
“For the foreseeable future, small footprints mean small payoffs for
the U.S.–where limited U.S. interests preclude large deployments,
major results will rarely be possible from minor investments in
[Security Force Assistance].”6
This is not to say Biddle et al. are proposing the United States write blank
checks to underwrite the world’s militaries irresponsibly. Instead, they
contend that it should either be prepared to spend a lot for little gain or to
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be far more selective in its choice of military aid recipients and opting out
of intervention often.
Scholars on the other side of the theoretical divide argue the inverse and
call for a limited and regionally oriented approach to aid allocation. Their
intent is to prevent overinvestment in any one country, fearing that
overcommitment guarantees waste and runs the risk of generating
negative returns for each additional dollar spent. For example, Drs. Dafna
Rand and Stephen Tankel conclude that “At best, an over
commitment…has a benign effect on the recipient, even if it burdens the
U.S. taxpayers, with little return on the investment. At worst, this
approach can overwhelm a recipient with low absorption capacity or
distort its incentive structure.”7 Their assertion stems from the belief that
the U.S. security cooperation community is unable to appropriately match
the quantities and types of aid to the recipient’s changing circumstances,
needs, and abilities due to organizational and bureaucratic impediments.
Policy makers thus tend to design assistance programs around tenuous
assumptions regarding the recipient’s modus operandi, which in
conjunction with strategic and structural shortcomings in terms of
governing policies, laws, and regulations, severely hamper the United
States’ ability to provide aid effectively.8 As such, fiscal restraint would
serve American interests best.
Under tighter scrutiny, however, an even more fundamental divide
between the proponents of large or small security cooperation approaches
comes into focus. Taking a more holistic view, it appears the problem of
where one stands depends most upon whether one views the pathologies
of either rational choice or organizational behavior paradigms as being
more detrimental. Consideration of these well-established alternative
theoretical frameworks provides salient insights into the challenges that
policy makers must overcome in provisioning aid as well as
recommendations for potential programmatic remedies that they might
otherwise miss.
Go Big: Overpowering the Principal-Agent Problem
Principal-agent problems derive from the rational actor model, which
holds that states are utility maximizing entities behaving in accordance
with a logical assessment of costs and benefits.9 They arise inevitably when
34
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one party delegates authority to another via a contract, whether formal or
informal, with an expectation of performance on its behalf. Unfortunately
for the principal (the aid donor), agency costs accumulate as agents take
initiative and act out of rational self-interest to capitalize on opportunities
to pursue their own goals. Such costs increase with the degree of difference
between the principal and the agent’s preferences as well as the amount of
information leverage the agent can accumulate. Agents gain this leverage
either by withholding information or by preventing the principal from
observing the agent’s actions—while the cat is away, the mice will play. The
principal’s inability to perfectly monitor its agents results in agency slack,
which takes the forms of “shirking (minimizing the effort it exerts) and
slippage (actively pursuing its own interests, not the principal’s).”10
Although contractual constraints and incentives can influence the agent’s
behavior and can help keep costs under control, their formulation and
enforcement also require adequate information that is costly to acquire, if
the principal can obtain it at all.11
Rational choice adherents see security cooperation as particularly
susceptible to the principal-agent problem. Eli Berman and David Lake
provide two reasons stating that the interests of foreign proxies rarely
align with those of the principal and that their leaders often depend on
those who the principal desires action against for their own political (and
at times earthly) survival.12 As a consequence, they “[reject] unequivocally
the unconditional capacity-building approach to indirect action currently
pursued by the United States and others…[but also predict] that capacity
building can be a successful strategy when interests are closely aligned and
the agent’s costs of effort are low.”13 The last time the United States truly
encountered these conditions in nearly ideal conjunction was in the
immediate aftermath of World War II, the presence of which made
possible its reconstruction of Europe and Japan as the Cold War
accelerated. That such a fortuitous opportunity might arise again any time
soon is highly unlikely.
To overcome agency costs, Biddle et al. suggest principals be prepared to
overpower agency losses by paying a lot for a questionable return. Because
of the high probability of misaligned interests, “agency losses will be large,
monitoring and conditionality will be expensive and highly imperfect, and
the net gain in allied military performance is likely to be much less than
U.S. policy makers will hope or expect.”14 Relatedly, research by Patricia
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Sullivan, Brock Tessman, and Xiaojun Li highlights the deleterious effect
of increased aid on cooperative recipient state behavior. Because success
in achieving US policy goals is likely to lead to a reduction in military aid
flows (and access to largesse), partners are disincentivized from following
through on their commitments fully.15 As such, refraining from
intervention altogether may serve the United States better if it is unable to
justify such inefficiency.
Go Home: Overpowered by Organizational Behavior
Berman and Lake offer a salient critique of the principal-agent assessment
by noting that it focuses on the drivers of agent decision making without
addressing what animates the principal and offer three hypotheses in
anticipation of future research.16 First, the power balance between
principal and agent may preclude the effective imposition of punishments
for performance failures. Second, domestic political constraints can
prevent principals from granting effective rewards. Finally, principals may
also fail to select appropriate incentives due to a misreading of interest
alignment.17 In addition to these proffered reasons, however, the literature
identifies a fourth possibility—that the principal’s organizational programs
and standard operating procedures neither permit the institutional
coherence nor the agility required for their successful implementation.
Contrasting with the rational choice paradigm, the organizational behavior
model holds that quasi-independent suborganizations act on imperfect
information through pre-established routines that shape outputs, resulting
in products that only roughly align with command intent.18
Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow observe that the dysfunctions of
organizational logic plague government organizations by nature as “they
cannot keep their profits; they have limited control over organization of
production; they have limited control over their goals; they have external
(as well as internal) rules governing their administrative procedures; and
their outputs take a form that often defy easy evaluation.”19 Furthermore,
their structures and operating habits are the resultants of political pulling
and hauling, taking on forms that reflect the interests, strategies, and
compromises of stakeholders within the system. Indeed, as Terry Moe
laments bluntly, “American public bureaucracy is not designed to be
effective.”20
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While the rigidity of bureaucratic programs and standard operating
procedures does have the benefit of affording predictability in an uncertain
strategic environment, it also prevents organizations from adapting to
changing circumstances. As organizations mature, bureaucratic inertia
and transaction costs limit the possibilities for future development.
Instead of reinventing themselves, organizations tend to prefer the mere
recombination of preexisting routines akin to a rearrangement of deck
chairs in hopes of saving a sinking ship.21 The fact that Congress has only
amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the primary legislation
authorizing aid programs, for the past 60 years and eschewed
opportunities for more comprehensive reform underscores this
perspective.22
Looking introspectively, organizational behavioralists apply these
considerations to the security cooperation community’s bureaucracy and
point their fingers at it as the source of its own problems. They claim that
although the cumbersome procedures in place may be sufficient to execute
smaller and simpler projects, management issues compound as aid
packages become more expansive to the eventual point of deadlock.23
Rand and Tankel highlight how the community’s strategic and structural
deficiencies beleaguer efforts, leading them to conclude that more aid and
more authorities through which to execute them—the typical institutional
responses—do not necessarily lead to better outcomes. These managerial
shortcomings include poorly articulated goals, unprioritized and
conflicting objectives, and ignorance of political factors on the ground.
Additionally, structural deficiencies stem from the unwieldy web of
competing legal authorities across the interagency and the imbalance in
resources made available to the State Department as compared to the
DoD.
Considering these issues, Rand and Tankel contend that the United States
will remain unable to program and execute security assistance programs
effectively or efficiently absent significant reform which is unlikely to
occur. This in turn leads them to recommend circumscribing the size and
scope of aid programs. However, the authors note that achieving such
restraint is also an uphill battle as Pentagon bureaucracies exhibit a
tendency hedge against unforeseen challenges by buttressing projects with
more resources in the absence of real metrics to facilitate better decision
making. While the authors stop short of recommending against utilizing
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security cooperation altogether, they are skeptical of the current approach
and emphasize the necessity to invest more on non-material solutions that
unfortunately do not lend themselves well to existing measures.24

Data and Methods
Measuring Security Cooperation Objectives
According to DoD policy, the intent is not to simply give away security
cooperation dollars as an altruistic form of welfare to ailing nations.
Rather, DoD Directive 5132.03 specifies the overarching objectives for
these programs:
1. Develop allied and partner defense and security capabilities
and capacity for self-defense and multinational operations;
2. Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to
host nations;
3. Build defense relationships that promote specific U.S.
security interests; and
4. Take other actions in support of U.S. objectives.25
Supporting these objectives, the United States Army’s plan for Army
International Activities provides eight amplifying ends that nest under
them. These ends include assuring allies, promoting stability and
democracy, establishing relations, improving non-military cooperation,
promoting transformation, improving interoperability, and improving
defense capabilities.26 While it is beyond the scope of this article to
attempt an evaluation of each line of effort, this analysis focuses on the
political, political-military, and militarily oriented goals of promoting
democracy, promoting stability, and improving defense capabilities since
they correspond best with available datasets. Furthermore, they are also
the most visible goals that policy makers, academics, and the public
frequently seize upon.
An examination uses ordinary least squares linear regression with one
independent variable, two controls, and three dependent variables while
accounting for fixed country and time effects. Each of the following
dependent variables corresponds with the political, political/military, and
military goals in turn. See Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Relationship Between Variables and Objectives
Military Aid $
(IV)
Economic
Aid $, GDP
(Ctrls)

Neopatrimonialism
(DV 1)

Praetorianism
(DV 2)

Conflict & Terror
Death Rate (DV 3)

Promote Democracy
(Political)

Promote Stability
(Political/Military)

Improve Defense
Capabilities
(Military)

Source: Author.
The first, neopatrimonialism, is a combination of “clientelistic political
relationships, strong and unconstrained presidents, and the use of public
resources for political legitimation.”27 The second is praetorianism,
defined as “the extent to which the appointment and dismissal of the chief
executive is based on the threat or actual use of military force.”28 The final
variable is the frequency of political violence by non-state actors.
An analysis intentionally seeks only to provide a highly generalized
assessment that simply establishes a generic base rate of military aid’s
effect in the terms of the three dependent variables across the aggregate of
all security cooperation activities. Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardner
emphasize that the absence of this type of base rate information renders
decision makers unable to correctly anchor their judgements against
prejudiced perceptions stemming from cognitive biases.29 However, such a
benchmark is precisely what is missing from the ongoing discourse. Daniel
Kahneman terms this baseline prior to the outside view, which is akin to
the output of a deliberately underspecified model. Decision makers should
then incorporate inside view information that is unique to a specific
undertaking to consider what advantages or disadvantages their current
project may possess.30 Taken together, the two data points facilitate more
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accurate estimates of whether an outcome may be desirable or not in a
planning process referred to as reference class forecasting.
The panel data for the following analysis is an aggregate of elements
drawn from several sources. These are the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID)’s historical dataset, the Varieties of
Democracy (V-Dem) project, the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index,
and Our World in Data’s War and Peace collection. The V-Dem dataset
contains data on 202 countries from 1789 to 2020 and includes the
dependent variables of neopatrimonialism and praetorianism. To derive
the subset of fragile states, the data only includes countries scoring below
the cautionary Fragile States Index threshold of 60 on a scale of 0-120.
Furthermore, the timespan begins with the year 2002 to reflect only post9/11 security cooperation and ends with 2019 as the last year with
complete data available.
Independent Variable
The researcher selected the independent variable of military assistance
dollars because it is the most fungible and best represents an effort’s
priority through measurable tangible commitment, serves to indicate the
magnitude of effort invested in each partner nation recipient. USAID’s
database reports all foreign aid transactions to each recipient per year by
all U.S. government agencies since 1947 in accordance with the Foreign
Assistance Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016. The agency
verifies this data against federal budget and treasury statements prior to
publication, making it the most comprehensive and reliable source for this
information.31
Dependent Variables
The first dependent variable under test is neopatrimonialism as reported
by V-Dem, which reflects progress with respect to the political objectives
of security cooperation in terms of democratization. States tend to express
this malady by installing officials for their political expedience rather than
their competency, systemic corruption, exclusionary political institutions,
and “the absence of any normative glue to bind rulers and followers in a
joint national project.”32 Furthermore, neopatrimonial states do not
qualify as modern nor rational-legal, and are unable to generate
40
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“purposive power” as a result.33 Neopatrimonialism is also recognized as
one of the primary attributes stifling democratic transitions and
reinforcing authoritarianism.34 V-Dem constructs this index using
Bayesian Factor Analysis of 16 indicators contained in three sub-indices
(clientelism, presidentialism, and regime corruption), then reports values
on a 0-1 interval. Lower values indicate a more democratic and
normatively better situation.35
Critics of security cooperation initiatives often charge that foreign aid has
the unintended consequence of feeding neopatrimonial habits. Berman
and Lake are particularly troubled by their findings in this respect,
observing that “local agents, when not appropriately incentivized, often
use foreign military assistance to shore up the opposite of inclusive
governance: A patronage security service that threatens political rivals.”36
This suggests the regression model should produce counterproductive
results in terms of these first two variables, especially if military aid
programs are not implemented with appropriate controls over how
partner nations utilize their newfound capacity.
The second dependent variable, praetorianism, refers to the degree to
which the military threatens to overwhelm the state’s executive and
corresponds with the political-military dimension of stability. Although
Samuel Huntington takes a more expansive view and includes additional
populist social forces that insufficiently developed political institutions
struggle to restrain in his definition of the term, the core concept remains
the same. Weak differentiation between political, military, religious, social,
and economic spheres of national life and their leaders leads to a
cacophony that undermines a state’s proper functioning. In this context,
the underdeveloped traditions of military professionalism and civilmilitary relations in praetorian societies pose a threat to the ruling regime
as the armed forces work to maintain political autonomy from, and often
influence over, civilian leadership.37 The V-Dem military dimension index
measures praetorianism by aggregating on a 0-1 interval scale “whether
the ‘chief executive’ was (a) appointed through a coup, rebellion or by the
military, and (b) can be dismissed by the military. Both condition (a) and
(b) are coded as present (1) or not (0); [then averaged] across the two.”38
As empirical evidence for the correlation between security cooperation and
praetorianism, Will Reno and Jahara Matisek highlight the risk associated
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with military assistance programs.39 They note that some opponents of
military aid take issue with the International Military Education and
Training and the Countering Terrorism Fellowship programs in particular
because of the increased incidence of coups d’état among its participants.
In one specific instance, a Gambian graduate of the National Defense
University in Washington, DC concluded upon returning to Gambia that
“serving his president, who was involved in massive corruption and drugtrafficking, was at odds with his professional military education.”40 Jesse
Savage and Jonathan Caverley similarly argue that military training in
particular is unique in its ability to strengthen the recipient force relative
to the government compared to other forms of military aid.41 As such, aid
given to fragile state militaries lacking strong institutional foundations
should correlate with an increase in praetorian consequences.
Finally, Our World in Data’s dataset captures annual death rates from
conflict and terrorism by country, which provides a useful proxy for
military effectiveness.42 On the one hand, one would expect violence to
increase in the immediate wake of military aid disbursement because
partner forces should be better able to confront perpetrators of violence.
According to Stathis Kalyvas, violence is most likely to increase when and
where the balance between government and non-state actors is in contest
and lowest where one has either secured control or there is a stalemate.43
On the other hand, overall violence should diminish after an initial spike
as the government applies its new military capacity and establishes
control.44 Thus, increases in partner nation military effectiveness should
ultimately yield a net decrease in violence eventually.
Research by other scholars suggests it is possible that the inverse
hypothesis—that overall violence initially drops before rising again—could
be true instead. Amira Jadoon argues that military aid can successfully
reduce the magnitude of armed conflict in the short-term when sufficiently
strong internal governance structures exist.45 However, in their absence “A
coercive capacity boost…falls short of constraining the associated negative
consequences such as movement of violent nonstate actors to low‐threat
areas or violent backlashes against soft targets.”46 While a negative sign
favors the prevalence of Kalyvas’s logic, a positively signed coefficient for
this variable raises the question of whether military aid packages in
general need to be made more holistic (and expansive) by incorporating
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political and socioeconomic support elements as a means of boosting an
effort’s efficacy toward reducing violence.47
Control Variables
The research design incorporates two economic control variables, the first
of which is non-military assistance spending as reported by the USAID
dataset.48 Since high levels of economic aid have the potential to feed
neopatrimonialism, strengthen regimes, or mitigate drivers of unrest, it is
necessary to ensure these factors are not masking the effects of military
spending on these areas. Second, the model uses logged gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita as reported by the World Bank to control for the
recipients’ levels of economic development as more developed nations are
likely to do a better job of absorbing aid and applying it to its intended
purpose.49

Results
With respect to small security cooperation programs (Table 1), there is a
strong correlation between increased levels of aid and decreases in all
three dependent variables. While of modest magnitude, the negative
association between neopatrimonialism and praetorianism challenges the
conventional wisdom suggesting any military assistance tends to feed
corruption and increase the risk of a coup.50 Additionally, the reduction in
violence afforded by increased military aid spending confirms its utility in
this respect even when the amount of aid given is low. In large security
cooperation projects (Table 2), increases in aid also associate strongly with
a reduction in neopatrimonialism and the death rate. While the effect on
neopatrimonialism does not change significantly between the two levels of
aid, large programs have twice the utility in reducing violence. However,
the ameliorating effect of military assistance on praetorianism drops out
once spending increases above $20M per year.
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Table 1. Foreign Military Assistance Dollars v. Outcomes–Small Programs
Dependent Variable
Neopatrimonialism Praetorianism Violent Deaths /
100k Pop.
Military Aid
-0.00228***
-0.00277***
-0.40826**
(log)
(0.00046)
(0.00051)
(0.21199)
Economic Aid
(log)

GDP Per
Capita (log)
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std.
Error

-0.00181**

-0.00279***

1.47506***

(0.00078)

(0.00086)

(0.34086)

-0.01152*
(0.00685)

-0.00932
(0.00751)

-39.81420***
(3.06321)

1,548
0.94043
0.93605
0.06335 (df =
1428)

1,548
0.80586
0.79158
0.06946 (df =
1428)

1,351
0.33589
0.28161
26.18413 (df =
1248)

Note: Average is < $20M per year; df = degrees of freedom; * p < 0.1; ** p <
0.05; *** p < 0.01
Source: Author
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Table 2. Foreign Military Assistance Dollars v. Outcomes–Large Programs
Dependent Variable
Neopatrimonialism Praetorianism Violent Deaths
/ 100k Pop.
Military Aid
-0.00349**
-0.00052
-0.84681***
(log)
(0.00176)
(0.00124)
(0.24681)
Economic Aid
(log)

GDP Per
Capita (log)
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std.
Error

-0.02223***

-0.00569**

0.46652

(0.00323)

(0.00227)

(0.45847)

0.05733*
(0.03024)

0.01527
(0.02128)

7.65498
(4.72029)

318
0.80678
0.78046
0.09366 (df = 279)

318
0.77561
0.74505
0.06591 (df =
279)

282
0.49947
0.42593
12.67117 (df =
245)

Note: Average is > $20M per year; df = degrees of freedom; * p < 0.1; ** p <
0.05; *** p < 0.01
Source: Author

The implications of these findings are twofold. First, military aid’s efficacy
in aggregate may not warrant the negative perceptions commonly ascribed
to it. Given the prevalence of the association of foreign aid with adverse
outcomes in current discourse, there is a possibility that researchers are
undervaluing the minor yet cumulative successes of security cooperation
over time and overemphasizing the comparatively rare but spectacular
high-profile failures. Without the generic, reference-class base rate this
analysis provides, it is difficult to overcome such biases and attain a
holistic view of what military aid does achieve.
Second, the findings do not clearly settle the debate between the large and
small aid approaches and their underlying theories. Since both have their
own strengths and drawbacks, the optimal scale depends upon what the
United States is trying to accomplish versus what it is willing to pay for the
result. Small programs may affordably help ailing fragile states to develop
45
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss4/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.4.2034

Yi: Go Big or Go Home

stronger institutions, albeit modestly. Conversely, large programs may
save lives by reducing levels of violence but may not be cost effective for
stimulating partner nation institutional development. Both the principalagent and organizational behavior models provide useful insights into the
challenges impeding effective and efficient provision of military aid is
obvious. However, blanket pessimism over security cooperation’s utility as
a valid U.S. policy tool for promoting democracy and stability abroad
appears unjustified.
This base rate data suggests military aid can improve partner nations with
respect to all three dependent variables although the scale of the aid
package affects which aspects and to what degree. Large military
assistance programs are best suited for countries facing short-term
existential crises that feature a surge in violence. Small military assistance
programs may stimulate partner force professionalization over the long
run by forcing a focus on non-material human capital development and
away from expensive hardware acquisitions. Thus, the right size of an aid
package is dependent on the most pressing exigencies of the moment.
One potential criticism is that the military assistance spending data does
not differentiate between dollars spent on material or non-material forms
of military aid. This is important because hardware transfers are more
fungible than training and education in terms of how regimes can
reallocate resources to other purposes and may therefore affect each
dependent variable differently.51 For instance, officer training may be
uniquely effective in strengthening social bonds among cohorts and
thereby could help lay the groundwork for future coup planning.52 An
upcoming project will draw upon the newly released International Military
Training Activities Database-USA dataset, which “include[s] key details
such as: Objectives; activities such as train-and-equip; the location of
training; and characteristics of the forces trained,” to investigate the
relationship between forms of aid by testing whether programs increase in
material bias as they grow.53 In conjunction with existing data, this future
research will deliver insight into the ratio of potency between material and
non-material forms of assistance.
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Conclusion
The study compared two theories of security cooperation to determine
whether quantitative analysis might reveal a correlation between foreign
military aid spending and three proxies for the policy approach’s stated
objectives. By analyzing how project size correlates with outcomes in
terms of political, political-military, and military dimensions, it quantified
a base rate of success in each area for small- and large-scale efforts. Armed
with this information, policy makers can make better informed decisions.
These results challenge the conventional wisdom that increasing foreign
aid merely feeds corruption and that to bolster foreign militaries is to beg
for a coup. Controlling for economic aid and GDP per capita, both small
and large military assistance packages strongly correlate with a reduction
in neopatrimonialism and deaths due to violent conflict and terrorism in
recipient nations. While small aid programs might temper the risk of a
coup, this relationship does not hold for large ones. This research also calls
into question the oft-assumed degree to which principal-agent problems
and organizational behavior hamper effective aid provision. Even though it
is likely both do play a role in increasing costs and decreasing efficiency,
neither challenge appears inherently fatal nor insurmountable.
The research results highlight the need not only for better metrics with
which to gauge the efficacy of security cooperation, but also for improved
theories to inform what to measure. Since both the principal-agent and
organizational behavior models focus myopically on either the donor or
the recipient to their detriment, a synthetic theory that accommodates
both perspectives and differentiates between tangible and nontangible
forms of military aid would be a significant contribution. As the United
States moves beyond its recent experiences with Iraq and Afghanistan and
reconsiders its approach to security cooperation, such knowledge will be
necessary to choose a path forward. The imperative that the United States
chooses correctly is even more critical given the tool’s central position in
the West’s strategic competition toolkit.
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